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Australian multiculturalism is undergoing major challenges, reformulations and re-invigoration. 
In part this is due to the rapidly increasing presence of Chinese communities. In the past ‘The 
Chinese’ were both a major trigger for the creation of and later protagonists for the abolition of 
White Australia. The complex and multiple layers of engagement of the Chinese in the 
Australian political system range from inter-governmental relations, through national political 
and policy issues, to local politics. Their involvement in a wide range of political parties and the 
interweaving of international and national politics, and economic and policy decisions,  indicates 
political and policy changes that may transcend the problematic of a multiculturalism constituted 
before the terror attacks of 2001 and before the rise of China as an international economic and 
political force in the wake of the 2007-8 Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Moreover the effective 
integration of the Chinese into Australian society may depend on how well the human rights 
dimension of multicultural policy is applied and conveyed to and through the Chinese 
population. 
  
Introduction: Multiculturalism in modern Australia 
 
The Australian government’s apparent recognition in early 2011 that the country’s contemporary 
challenges required a re-invigoration of a multicultural policy that elsewhere was suffering 
abandonment and condemnation, significantly reframed the ethnic political landscape.  
Multiculturalism encompasses the concept of identification, referring to the sense that 
“belonging to one’s country is necessary to make a success of a multicultural society” (Modood 
2007:150). It requires “a citizenship and the right to make a claim on the national identity in 
which negative difference is challenged and supplanted by positive difference” (Modood 
2007:153). 
 
The policy statement by the Government was supported by the conservative Opposition, 
supposedly inheritors of the low profile small-m multiculturalism of the Howard years. By the 
NSW State election of March 2011, both the Liberal leader Barry O’Farrell and the ALP Premier 
Kristina Kenneally were proudly heralding their support for multiculturalism. Ultimately the 
Liberal Party won that state election, with huge swings towards it in the heavily ethnic areas of 
western Sydney; “several major communities, especially the Chinese, moved en bloc from Labor 
to Liberal in key seats. This cost Labor several seats, particularly Strathfield(20% swing) and 
Rockdale (13% swing), and took Labor to the brink of defeat in Kogarah (15% swing)” (West 
2011). 
  
If multiculturalism as a policy discourse in national government can oscillate between denial and 
celebration so remarkably in fairly short periods, what are the social factors that contribute to this 
dynamism? What does the politics of multiculturalism reveal about the role of government and 
civil society in managing the contradictions of a poly-ethnic polity? These questions require an 
exploration of the changing position, role and influence of Chinese communities as participants 
in the contemporary Australian political scene. The Chinese provide an important case study of a 
network of communities with a common ‘image’ in wider Australian society (Tan 2006), who 
are however extraordinarily diverse, complex and differentiated by location, history, culture, 
language, politics, origin and class. The numbers of Chinese are rapidly rising; at the same time, 
they are one of the few communities which is both large in resident numbers, and part of a wider 
global diaspora that is economically of great importance to Australia. 
  
Unlike other immigrant communities who arrived in large numbers after World War 2, such as 
the Italians and Greeks, the Chinese arrivals of the past two generations and their predecessors 
from the days before White Australia (1901-1973) are important within Australia, yet are also 
linked to regional economies that are crucial to Australia’s economic survival (which many other 
immigrant groups are not). Only the British have demonstrated a comparable pattern of major 
population presence and global trading and political importance. In addition, the concentration of 
the Chinese in particular urban localities and their economic strength gives them an increasing 
degree of political potential similar to longer-established European-origin communities. 
  
The Vietnamese and other Indo-Chinese intake of the late 1970s finally ended the White 
Australia mind-set of government. Australia adopted multiculturalism through the Parliamentary 
tabling of the Galbally Report in 1978 in ten languages (Galbally 1978). Even so, while White 
Australia had passed from government policy settings, it had not disappeared from Australian 
society. Prof Jerzy Zubrzycki, a key adviser to the Fraser government, warned as early as 1977 
(as the Galbally Report was being finalised) that there was widespread opposition still to non-
White immigration (Zubrzycki 1977;1995). 
  
Meanwhile Australia’s trade with China was growing rapidly, and the first immigration from 
Hong Kong, Taiwan and the Chinese diasporic communities of Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia 
and Indo-china was also expanding. Through the 1980s Asian immigration increased and 
moments of major social reaction emerged. In 1984/85 historian Geoffrey Blainey identified 
dangers in Asian immigration and multiculturalism (Blainey 1984).  Also in 1984 Britain signed 
the agreement to hand back Hong Kong to China in 1997, prompting a new demand for 
immigration opportunities. 
  
The June 4 1989 Tiananmen democracy confrontation changed the underpinning for Australia’s 
policy on Chinese immigration once more. The Hawke government decided that some 40,000 
students from China studying in Australia would be able to stay if they wished.  The following 
year the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission reported on the upsurge in racist 
violence in Australia, consequent on the debate that Blainey’s comments had triggered half a 
decade before (HREOC 1991). 
  
The 1996 federal election won by the Coalition under John Howard, an opponent of 
multiculturalism, also marked the appearance on the national scene of newly-elected Queensland 
independent and  former Liberal MP Pauline Hanson. She advocated a return to a unitary pre-
multicultural Australia (Jakubowicz 1997/2010). While Hanson’s success and the consequent 
rise of the One Nation Party she later established did much to destroy the bi-partisan support for 
multiculturalism that had dominated the period from 1976 to 1985, in retrospect the forces that 
Zubrzycki had warned of at the very advent of the policy were never far from the surface in the 
public debate. 
  
Hanson’s election focused public attention on her primary target, ‘Asians’ whom she believed 
had failed to assimilate into Australian society. While the public debate generated by Blainey’s 
comments had primarily concerned Indo-Chinese refugees and immigrants, it was in fact the 
surging numbers of ethnic Chinese from diverse origins (including Indo-China) who were 
transforming Australia’s ethnoscape (Appadurai 1996: 27, 45): it was to be the unique 
combination of their numbers, diversity, education levels, economic capacity, diasporic linkages 
and international political leverage that would make the Chinese such an important dimension of 
the next  fifteen years of debate about multiculturalism. They were to be the most high-profile 
community to take a stand against the diminution of multiculturalism, key participants in the 
return of the ALP to federal power in 2007, a major influence on the rebirth of multiculturalism, 
and then significant contributors to the transformation in the Australian political landscape 
towards the conservative parties that occurred from 2010 onwards. 
  
Who are Australia’s ‘Chinese’?  
 
The Chinese reside in Australia as citizens, settlers, transient workers, students, business people, 
diplomats and other government officials, refugees and short term residents.  The diversity 
within the category reflects the complexity of the Chinese diaspora and the political argument 
about what it means to be Chinese.  The Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) is a vast country 
itself encompassing enormous diversity while the Chinese extend far beyond the PRC. Virtual 
Huaren (ethnic Chinese - ‘ren’ people, ‘Hua’ Chinese) networks build these diasporic 
interconnections.  Yet they are only one part of the story. 
  
The diversity of the Chinese in Australia reflects their complex histories. Even though Chinese 
had arrived before the gold rushes of the nineteenth century and at times and in places were the 
majority non-Indigenous population (e.g. on the northern Queensland gold fields at Palmer River 
in the 1880s), the Commonwealth of Australia found common purpose amongst its former 
colonies in uniting against further Chinese immigration. This was realised through the enactment 
of the 1901 Immigration Restriction Act, the basis of what became known as ‘White Australia 
Policy’. From 1901 on the Chinese population began to decline, even though strong pockets 
survived in the main cities and some rural areas throughout the first half of the twentieth century. 
While some wartime South East Asian diasporic Chinese refugees found safety in Australia after 
the Japanese expansion south from 1941, they were expelled from Australia after 1945. Ethnic 
Chinese nevertheless continued to come and go in small numbers despite bans on permanent 
residence. However as indicated above, with the end of White Australia in the 1970s, Chinese 
immigration grew rapidly, fuelled both by changing circumstances in the region, and by 
acceptance in Australia. 
  
By the end of the first decade of the 21st century, this diversity in the Chinese presence was 
reflected in the many different ‘kinds of Chinese’ identifiable in the wider community. The 
descendants of the earliest settlers, long isolated from China though in contact with other 
regional diasporic centres, had become part of the wider Australian society, often with no 
memory of Chinese language. They had been enhanced by the Colombo Plan generation of the 
1960s, mainly English-speaking tertiary educated Chinese diaspora from Singapore, Malaysia, 
etc. Some were Chinese Malays with radical political views who came to Australia in the post- 
Malay insurgency period, especially those who feared the rise of Malay nationalism.  
  
With the end of White Australia Policy in the early 1970s, Australia became more open to the 
wider Chinese diaspora in the region. Some came as refugees at the end of the Indo-China war in 
1975, from south Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.  Soon changes in China itself with the end of the 
Cultural Revolution and the easing of international movement restrictions permitted PRC 
citizens to leave, often gaining entry to Australia as skilled immigrants, or for a shorter term as 
students. In addition to the 40,000 Chinese students allowed to stay in Australia following the 
Tiananmen events of June 4 1989, over the next decade refugee applications from Chinese 
citizens for other reasons also increased. 
  
Meanwhile P R China’s claims to be the suzerain in some sense of all ethnic Chinese, whether 
resident on the mainland, in Taiwan or elsewhere, had additional effects in Australia. While the 
1984 signal of the hand-over of Hong Kong began the process of Hong Kong residents assessing 
their future options, the hand-over itself in 1997 created another stream of immigrants to 
Australia, both prior to and after the event. As key areas of Australia’s capital cities became 
more ‘Asianised’ in design and population, so they increased their attraction for other Chinese 
groups. Brisbane for instance became a magnet for people from Taiwan, making the Taiwanese a 
more significant part of the local Chinese population than in any other city (Kwok 2011): 
Australia-wide the Taiwan-born population grew by 17% in just the year 2008-2009 (ABS 
2010). 
  
China’s own regional policies played a role in the immigration of its non-Han citizens. Foremost 
among these were refugees from Tibet, especially as government pressure on the country 
increased with the rising number of Han Chinese relocating there.  Similarly, Uighurs from 
Xinjiang, mainly Muslim Mongol peoples, while claimed as Chinese, brought with them a long 
history of resisting incorporation into Beijing’s zone of control. 
  
Another rapidly growing group encompasses those who now figure in the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics Nett Overseas Migration calculations (NOM), even though they hold visas only for 
short-term residence. These groups now constitute a major component of the Chinese population, 
with three significant elements: the so-called 457 skilled guest-workers (employer-sponsored and 
with limited freedom of action outside the visa conditions), international students, and business 
visa holders[i]. 
  
Other categories include people who arrive on a short-term visa and then claim refugee status 
(RRT 2008), often seeking recognition for claims of suffering persecution as members of Falung 
Gong or as Christians. At the opposite end of the social scale are short term business managers, 
skilled workers, professionals and officials associated with large Chinese development projects, 
especially in the minerals extraction industry. China and Taiwan also have diplomatic, security 
and news agency staff, some of whom monitor all the other groups. There may indeed be other 
categories, and of course there are significant provincial/regional variations in migration 
histories, languages spoken, skill levels and education (Collins and Reid 1995). 
  
Why contemporary Chinese settlement in Australia sets up new issues 
  
The engagement of the Chinese diaspora with Australian political, economic and cultural life has 
thrown into sharp relief the insufficiency of traditional multiculturalism as providing an 
intellectual structure for analysis and a policy framework for response. This is not to discard 
multiculturalism, but to note that it can engage with only certain parts of the Chinese experience 
of and presence in Australia, and wider Australian engagement with the Chinese and the Chinese 
nations (PRC and Taiwan). In turning to a closer reading of the diversity of the Chinese 
engagement with Australia, and Australia’s engagement with the Chinese, the changing political 
environment at a global level throws some light on the issues raised. 
  
One of the more important dimensions can be found in the ‘ideology’ developed by the PRC to 
tell the ‘story of the nation’.  Feng (2011) notes a shift in official P R Chinese ideology after 
Tiananmen from a celebration of socialist achievement to an advancement of greater Han 
nationalism. During this period  the tenor of discussion in Australia has addressed the specific 
qualities of ‘Chineseness’, rather than canvassing the older fear of Chinese Communism that 
dominated the 1950 to 1980 period.  However the authoritarian/totalitarian nature of the PRC 
state has remained one component of the Australian conversation about China. The other 
significant component lies in the economic super-status of China and its role in Australia’s 
economic welfare, where expanding Chinese productive capacity has been the major factor in the 
so-called ‘mining boom’ in Australia, before the Global Financial Crisis, during the recession, 
and since the recovery began to be apparent in 2010. 
  
In 1976 at the first Census after the official end of White Australia, there were about 20,000 
people who had been born in China (though many others would see themselves as Chinese). In 
2001, the Census recorded some 143,000 born in China, which rose by 45% to 207,000 in 2006. 
By 2009, the China-born population had reached 351,000 ( an increase of some  144,000 or 70%, 
of which about 90,000 is from permanent arrivals) , with Hong Kong-born at 89,000 and 
Taiwan-born at 37,000 (ABS 2010). In 2008/9 the collectivity of identifiable Chinese (PR China, 
HK, Macau, Taiwan) made up the largest of the non-British permanent settler immigrant intakes, 
at over 30,000 [VC6]  (ABS, 2010). 
  
By the 2006 Census, some 700,000 Australians would trace a Chinese ancestor; people born in 
the Peoples’ Republic of China made up the third largest overseas-born group after the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand.  Chinese language speakers formed the second-largest language 
group after English, and Chinese formed the seventh largest ancestry group despite a fairly short 
recent immigration history. Unlike most other birthplace groups, the Chinese-born are 
increasingly spatially concentrated in Australia, lending weight to the sense of their locational 
influence and potential power (Coughlan 2008). ‘Chinese’ can be understood in a number of 
ways- as declared ancestry, as country of birth, or as language chosen to be spoken at home. In 
the 20 years from 1986 to 2006, the PRC-born population rose, albeit from a low base,  by over 
600%, people identifying Chinese ancestry by over 330%, and Chinese language speakers by 
over 400%. 
  
By 2010 Sydney’s Burwood, the most  densely Chinese-populated  local government area in 
Australia (Coughlan 2008), had two of its seven councillors of Chinese background, one from 
the Australian Labor Party and the other from the Liberal Party. Of the ten most Chinese 
populous localities the first five were all in Sydney, with three others in Brisbane. For some 
localities, the growth while dramatic, has been regular. Burwood’s Chinese rose from about 2000 
in 1986, to 5500 in 1996 (about 75%), then again to about 7500 in 2001, and to over 11,000 in 
2006. Ashfield, which took many of the Tiananmen  students, rose from just over 1000 in 1986, 
to about 8500 in 1996 (850%), falling back slightly as this group diffused locally to adjacent 
LGAs.  The Brisbane suburbs of Sunnybank and Robertson were much slower to ‘take off’, less 
affected by the Tiananmen period, with their most dramatic growth in the 2001/2006 period ( 
Sunnybank rising 3000 to 8000, or 170%, and Robertson 3000 to about 7500, or 150%) (figures 
recalculated from Coughlan 2008). 
  
The Chinese population is well educated (including the international student body) and 
concentrated in key areas of the ‘global economy’ such as IT and commerce. In general the 
Chinese represent the first large scale immigrant community which is already well-educated on 
arrival, and concentrated in strategic economic sectors. The class and education pattern of 
immigration from Europe in the 1950s and 1960s tended towards the low-skilled sector, while 
that from Indo-China in the 1970s and 1980s tended also to show the effects of war on broken 
educational opportunities. 
  
Table 1: Level of education and sector of employment by country of birth 
Level of education PRC-born % All Australians % 
Post grad degree 15.7 3.9 
Grad Dip/cert 1.6 2.2 
Bachelor degree 24.6 16.2 
Advanced Diploma etc 12.4 9.5 
Certificate 6.2 21.3 
No qualification 37.0 45.2 
Field     
Info tech 10.7 3.5 
Engineering 17.7 20.3 
Management commerce 32.1 20.8 
Other 39.5 55.4 
(ABS, 2006 Census) 
  
The Chinese immigrant population, arriving from a country with which Australia has rapidly 
expanding economic ties, enters a situation significantly different from that faced by earlier 
immigrant groups. By comparison, while immigration from Greece, Italy, Yugoslavia and 
Turkey grew rapidly during the 1950s,1960s and 1970s, and from Vietnam in the 1980s, 
Australia did not have a major economic stake in trade with their countries of origin. In contrast, 
China’s economic links with Australia continue to deepen. 
  
In the decade 1999 to 2009, during which Chinese immigration grew substantially, Australia’s 
trade with P R China grew from about $18 billion (imports and exports) to about $85 billion, 
with a five year export trend growth of 27% p.a.. In the three years 2007-2009,Chinese 
international students in Australia grew in export dollar value from $2.7 billion (contributing 
about about 12% of total Australian exports to China including minerals and agricultural 
products) to $4.1 billion (contributing about 10%), giving a five year trend line of nearly 19% 
annual growth, with a total figure of 154,000 students in 2009 (DFAT 2010). 
  
The Chinese community thus represents an emerging and unique constellation of factors that 
multiculturalism was never designed to accommodate or manage. Australia faces a growing part 
of the population whose earlier socialisation has been increasingly influenced by Han 
nationalism (Ho and Chio 2010, Feng 2011), yet who demonstrate early settlement period focus 
on employment, housing and education, rather than politics. Furthermore, in a climate of 
apparently vacillating Australian government support for multicultural social justice, equity and 
human rights, and where Australia’s economic well-being is believed to depend on good 
relations with the PRC (White 2010), the public policy challenges of ensuring equitable access to 
scarce public resources, including political representation, continue. 
  
The Chinese in Australian public awareness 
  
The March 2010 Lowy Institute survey of Australians’ attitudes to international affairs and 
China argued “that Australians are increasingly conscious of China’s rise and are starting to 
grapple with its implications. Indeed China looms so large that Australians have developed a 
somewhat exaggerated view of its global weight” (Shearer 2010).  China’s economic role 
through the purchase of raw materials had seen Australia safely through the GFC (Laurenceson, 
2008). 73% of Australians (up 10% from 2008) thought China’s growth had been good for 
Australia, although about the same proportion thought that China’s aim was to dominate Asia 
(up 9% since 2008). While happy to sell commodities to China, Australians were more reluctant 
to sell freehold to China -  57% thought the government allowed too much Chinese investment 
(up 7%). In addition 46% thought China would become a military threat within 20 years (up 
5%).  Meanwhile 2/3 believed Australia was soft on China’s transgression of human rights. Clive 
Palmer a Queensland billionaire mining magnate summarised the complexity when in September 
2009 he condemned as racist the government’s insistence that Chinese investments receive 
Treasury approval, claiming in relation to $1.8 trillion of Chinese reserve capital “We've got the 
opportunity to grab that if our politicians could only be fair and treat the Chinese people and 
Chinese government with the dignity they deserve" (Marriner 2009).  
  
Apart from the Foreign Investment Review Board criteria for differentiating Chinese from other 
sources of capital inflow, the government amended the Commonwealth Electoral Act in 2009 to 
outlaw foreign property donations to Australian political parties or involvement in political 
campaigns.  Figures released by the Australian Electoral Commission in early 2009 
(http://periodicdisclosures.aec.gov.au/) covering the 2007 Federal election identified a number of 
Chinese business people, especially linked to gambling and property development, as having 
made significant donations to both the major political parties. Some donations had been returned 
after failing ethical screenings (see Jakubowicz 2011). 
  
The picture of Australian national apprehension of China reflects the many different interests 
that Australians have – ranging from primary producers and resource companies, through 
manufacturing industry [au7] and infrastructure providers, to finance and education sectors. The 
most significant factor relates to the scale and interdependence of economic relations, where the 
Chinese economy is felt to now play a determining role in the viability of the Australian 
economy.  For the first time since early British empire days a foreign power now has both 
influence if not control over significant parts of the Australian economy and a large resident 
population. However unlike the British example, China has a central state strategy that integrates 
the role of diverse Chinese companies in Australia into a broader global strategy focused on 
resource security (as it does elsewhere in the Pacific and in Africa and South America).  The 
specific form of the Chinese state with a central directing political elite, its concern for resource 
and energy security, and its intensifying emphasis on the ethno-nationalist underpinning of the 
Chinese cultural diaspora, moves us beyond the older form of interest-group pluralist politics that 
typified multiculturalism in its first thirty years (Levey 2008).  
  
Multicultural politics and Chinese diversity 
  
A high proportion of Australia’s ‘Chinese’ live in the Sydney Statistical Division (SD). In 2006 
about 53% of all Australia’s China-born population lived in the Sydney SD, comprising some 
71% of the total ‘Chinese’ population in the city (including PRC, HK, Taiwan); some of the 
PRC-born may moreover have been long-term residents of Hong Kong or Taiwan prior to 
immigration. 
  
About 230,000 people claim to speak at least one of the named Chinese languages (Cantonese, 
Mandarin, Other), far higher than the 150,000 who were born in one of the Chinas. Of these 
about 125,000 speak Cantonese, and 97,000 Mandarin, with 12,000 speaking Other languages 
(Teochew, Hokkien and Hakka).  About 290,000 claim Chinese ancestry, of whom 270,000 had 
both parents born overseas, with only 6000 having both born in Australia.  Mandarin speakers 
(from the mainland and Taiwan) have a lower likelihood of being Australian citizens than 
Cantonese speakers (61% vs. 86%), reflecting the historical political pressure for Australian 
citizenship among Hong Kong and Macau origin settlers, perhaps the reluctance of many PRC 
citizens to give up their PRC citizenship, and also recency of arrival.  However to confuse 
matters slightly, over a thousand Sydney residents born in China claimed both Russian Orthodox 
religious affiliation and Russian ancestry, while over 400 claimed Russian Orthodoxy and 
Chinese ancestry (calculated by the author from CDATA through ABS Census 2006). 
  
This diversity has been well documented (e.g.  Ang 2000), as its effects contribute to an apparent 
impossibility of a unified or cohesive Chinese political presence in Australia (though clearly not 
solely a characteristic of Chinese groups but more widely spread among ethnic communities). 
North American studies have pointed to the relatively low level of formal political 
representations of Chinese communities in the USA and Canada, relative to their size (Freedman 
2000; Fernando 2006). Three reasons are suggested for this situation among those who accept 
such claims: community fragmentation absorbs energy in intra-communal struggles for 
influence; the focus in the first generation on economic establishment and success absorbs most 
of the creative energy available to recent settlers – they would be more interested in Chinese 
schools than in Chinese politicians; and power is exerted through influence networks (mobilizing 
guanxi or influence through personal and family connections) (Hutchings & Murray 2002) rather 
than through access to authoritative institutional roles in the host society (Chin 1997; Kwok 
2008, 2011; Gao 2006, 2009).  
  
‘Chinese’ is therefore not such a bridging label as might commonly be thought.  But is this any 
different to what might be said of earlier immigrant communities, and their marginalisation 
through the first generation of settlement (Zappala 1998)? Given the diversity identified above, it 
might be argued that  the Chinese barely share enough of a common interest to be thought of as a 
cohesive ‘interest group’. Multicultural political analysis tends to examine ethnic groups as a 
sub-set of interest group politics, and thereby constructs a view of Australian society that frames 
ethnic communities as interest groups – with specific, usually first generation, concerns (Jupp 
1984; Jupp et al. 1989; Kymlicka 2007; Lopez 2000; Modood 2007). The standard ideological 
rhetoric of multiculturalism’s advocates usually seeks to mobilise wider social support through 
foregrounding concepts such as productive diversity, and arguing for its role in enhancing 
cosmopolitan capabilities in society, including bi-lingualism and intercultural communication 
competence (AMAC 2010). In this view, a sustainable multicultural polity could be said to 
depend on well-organised ethnically-focused organisations able both to articulate the particular 
interests of their groups, and engage in coalitions with similar groups to deliver broader policy 
outcomes that provide individual benefits to the groups, and to their constituencies (Levey 2008). 
Some of these organisations are purely local, some are international but locally-focused (e.g. clan 
groups), while some are trans-national (China/Australia) and others international (e.g. diasporic 
multi-nation associations)(Lever-Tracy et al. 1996; Suryadinata 2004). 
  
While ‘Chinese’ communities harbour a multiplicity of such groups and institutions, with inter-
linkages to commercial or quasi-commercial enterprises, there are now emerging a number of 
groups that specifically foreground the issues raised by participation in this multicultural polity, 
given the history of White Australia. Despite their diversity, they may indeed share one common 
challenge, that of Australian racism and the racialisation of Australian public life and discourse. 
  
The racism that has been a defining characteristic of Australian society in the past has not simply 
dissipated. Dunn (2003) has found that Australians are less (but even so still) prejudiced against 
‘Asians’ than they are against Muslims and Indigenous people; even so Booth et al. (2009) 
identified the Chinese as the group most likely to suffer discrimination in employment on the 
basis merely of their names. Critics (Dunn et al. 2011) have argued that one of  the major 
problems with Australian multiculturalism lies in systematic failure by government to engage 
with residual racism; indeed denial of racism has been a more likely response by government 
when confronted with inter-communal violence, than any sustained strategy of intervention (see 
Dunn and Nelson, this issue). Even the Government’s own Australian Human Rights 
Commission had criticised government inaction on racism in its submission to the United 
Nations (AHRC 2010). It was not until February 2011 in the policy announcement referred to 
above, that the Government announced the first full-time Race Discrimination Commissioner for 
over a decade, and a national anti-racism strategy. 
  
Australian Chinese have been involved in anti-racism politics from the first period they 
experienced its full force, soon after their arrival on the Victorian goldfields. They organised 
joint petitions with European miners and business people seeking equality of treatment, by 
colonial governments. In the lead up to Federation they organised and lobbied ultimately 
unsuccessfully both for recognition as equal members of Australian society, and for government 
action to reduce discrimination and prejudice (Fitzgerald 2007b). Major struggles erupted during 
the post-war (1946) attempts to expel Chinese refugees, while Chinese Australians were part of 
the 1960s struggle to end White Australia (Fitzgerald 2009). 
  
By the time of the Blainey controversy Australia’s ‘new Chinese’ were again actively involved 
in anti-racist politics. The Sydney-based Chinese Australian Forum was founded in 1986 as a 
‘unity’ movement to resist the re-racialisation of political discourse; similar groups emerged in 
Melbourne and Brisbane. They organised street rallies, ran meetings, prepared petitions, and 
generally developed a close set of links with progressive non-Chinese anti-racism activists, even 
though their own electoral base was somewhat limited. Moreover a decade later with the rise of 
Hanson their own base had expanded and their capacity and willingness to collaborate on anti-
racism issues had become more sophisticated. 
  
Chinese Australians have gained representation (usually at state level) in periods when race-
politics have been salient for the wider society, especially during the Hanson/One Nation 
ascendancy. During that time in NSW the anti-Hanson Unity Party elected Dr Peter Wong 
(formerly a Liberal member) to the Upper House, while former Liberal Party Upper House MP 
Helen Sham Ho left the party and sat as an independent.  In Victoria Chén Zhībīn was elected to 
the Senate for the Liberal Party (1999-2005) winning pre-selection against an incumbent, then 
losing it next time around.  That is, the Chinese were most likely to be successful when the wider 
social sentiment was more responsive to anti-racist arguments (paradoxically perhaps if 
Hanson’s ascendancy is the touchstone) and to do so within the conservative side of politics. A 
September 2010 Sydney Chinese in politics symposium (http://vimeo.com/17991025 at 18 min 
30 sec) heard from Dr Wong, who complained about the disappearance of Chinese politicians 
from Australian public life over recent years. In response a group of younger politicians in local 
government argued that they were now building political careers that were inter-ethnic, 
suggesting that the community’s perspective had changed somewhat, to accommodate to a 
visibly and culturally-diverse Australia. 
  
The Chinese community’s strong support for the successful ALP candidate Maxine McKew in 
the seat of Bennelong against then Prime Minister John Howard in 2007 reflected the view in the 
Chinese (and other Asian) communities that the Liberal Party under John Howard had adopted 
views that they experienced as racist, and that Howard symbolically represented the last embers 
of White Australia (Saville 2007). However Chinese community leaders expressed 
disappointment with the replacement of the Mandarin-speaking Kevin Rudd as PM, the failure of 
the ALP government to adopt a Bill of Rights, the failure in 2010 to advance a policy on 
multiculturalism, or to signal a public commitment against racism. Asian communities were to 
reduce if not withdraw their support for McKew at the 2010 election, and she lost the seat. By 
2011 they were part of a general turn towards the LNP at the NSW state election, which 
produced the huge swing away from the ALP described above. 
  
Overcoming the insufficiency: using the Chinese question to modernise Australia’s 
multiculturalism 
  
The ‘Chinese’ question raises for Australian political life the first major case of a post-
multicultural politics, where people who have settled in Australia also remain connected to an 
immigration source country with large scale economic ties to Australia. If so, the problem should 
register in public policy. A joint Parliamentary Inquiry into Multiculturalism by the Migration 
Committee in mid-2011 received over 350 submissions exploring the policy and its future 
prospects (http://aph.gov.au/house/committee/mig/multiculturalism/subs.htm). For the first time 
the Australian government’s exploration of multicultural policy was framed by issues associated 
with globalisation, with particular emphasis placed on source countries “in the region”, code 
primarily for China, and the role of diaspora populations in sustaining economic, cultural and 
political links. 
  
How these links might work, and what they might mean for domestic multicultural policy remain 
to be seen. However, the implications of patterns of participation that are said to be common 
among Chinese diasporas in the West, suggest a far greater emphasis will be needed on core 
practices to minimise racism. Freedman (2000) in her examination of Chinese in the political life 
of the USA found that the two key assumptions widely held in the scholarly literature and ‘in 
popular opinion’, that the Chinese are pawns of their homeland governments, and they are 
politically passive preferring to concentrate on economic advancement, were not upheld by 
recent research. The useful distinction is made between political influence and political 
participation, where influence reflects economic power, while participation depends on the 
political system’s openness to new entrants (2000:183). Fernando (2007) uses a ‘critical 
multiculturalism’ paradigm to compare Toronto and Los Angeles. The same contradiction exists, 
she finds, between economic success and apparent political exclusion. The problem she argues 
lies in the tension between a racialised state structure and a public ideology of equality, 
producing a ‘democratic deficit’. Multiculturalism as an ideology may disguise the realities of 
unequal access to power, where active blocking by existing power elites denies access to the 
formal political system.  
   
As globalisation intrudes increasingly into the domestic political world of Australia the 
democratic deficit ascribed by Fernando (2007) to ostensibly open political systems that remain 
enveloped by racialised hierarchies of access and power, emerges as an increasing challenge. 
Political systems that fail to recognise inequalities and barriers to mobility enshrined by cultural 
power can be faced with significant shifts in allegiance, and internal dislocation (Drapac 2009). 
With the maturation of new generations of younger Chinese Australians, their social and 
economic mobility now points to their likely greater political engagement. Australian 
multiculturalism needs to demonstrate its human rights priorities, so that those who are 
potentially caught in the strengthening diasporic ties with the Chinese homelands can mobilise 
Australia’s vision of an egalitarian, non-racist and rights-based political discourse both to find 
their place within Australian society, and undertake a robust dialogue with their putative country 
of origin. 
  
The ongoing debates about Australia’s multiculturalism draw from the broad range of society 
both vigorous support for and angry condemnation of the policy (Galligan and Roberts 2008). 
Yet for the sense of shared ownership towards which Tariq Modood alludes to become an 
ongoing reality, an emergent Australian multicultural nationalism has to include rather than 
marginalize its ‘Chinese’ citizens. If tensions exist they can best be moderated by asserting an 
inclusive program that validates difference while stressing common values associated with 
universal human rights. 
  
The withering of multicultural policy that Australia has witnessed for more than fifteen years, its 
low levels of resource and its lackadaisical implementation indicates that a new formulation is 
required. A renewed policy would allow Australia to articulate its future in the region and 
promote social integration of a diverse population. However, more than rhetoric is needed, given 
the deep structural discrimination revealed by the analysis of the Chinese experience in 
multicultural Australia. A strong and renewed multicultural policy that would ensure effective 
recognition of difference while reasserting the importance of reciprocal respect between cultural 
communities would do much to overcome the democratic deficit that otherwise could erode 
wider social inclusion. 
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[i] Changes to the calculation of the Nett Overseas Migration figures after 2006 ‘captured’ many of 
the students and 457 holders who leave the country within twelve-months (for vacations in China) , 
but return again over a number of years; NOM now includes data based on twelve months residence 
in sixteen (ABS 2010:42ff).  
 
 
